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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
This research is into the cause of excessive costs in civil litigation.  The research was 
commissioned by the National Accident Helpline Limited (NAH Ltd) following the Ministry of 
Justice’s (MOJ) announcement of a consultation on its proposals for reform of civil litigation 
costs in England and Wales.1  The research considers the cause of excessive and 
disproportionate costs in litigation, in particular in personal injury and clinical negligence 
claims.   
 
The MOJ’s proposals on the costs of litigation seek to implement the recommendations 
made in Lord Justice Jackson’s report on his review of civil litigation costs.2  In his report 
Lord Justice Jackson said that “the new recoverability regime introduced by the Access to 
Justice Act has had “unfortunate unintended consequences” and that “the conditional fee 
agreement (CFA) regime has emerged as one of the major drivers of excessive costs”3 due 
to with recoverable success fees and ATE insurance premiums.  
 
The MOJ in its consultation document explains that: 
  
A range of arguments were put to Sir Rupert during the course of his review both for 
and against retaining the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums. Those 
representing claimant interests are generally in favour of recoverability (citing 
concerns about liability for funding disbursements) and those representing defendant 
interests are generally opposed to recoverability (citing excessive costs).4  
 
Chapter 4, paragraph 3.1 of Lord Justice Jackson’s final report sets out sixteen general 
causes which, in differing combinations and according to particular circumstances, give rise 
                                                           
1 Ministry of Justice (2010) Proposals for reform of civil litigation funding and costs in England and 
Wales, London: Ministry of Justice – Available at:  
 http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/jackson-review-151110.htm  (accessed 19 January 2011) 
 
2 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/reports/review-of-civil-litigation-costs/civil-
litigation-costs-review-reports    
 
3 Final Report page 48, para 3.26   
 
4 Para 81, Ministry of Justice (2010) Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in 
England and Wales, London: Ministry of Justice 
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to excessive costs in litigation.  In considering the causes of excessive costs for the 
purposes of this research we are particularly concerned with the following causes cited by 
Jackson (preserving his numbering) : 
 
(iv) Too few solicitors, barristers and judges have a sufficient understanding of the 
law of costs or how costs may be controlled. 
 
(v) Lawyers are generally paid by reference to time spent, rather than work 
product 
 
(vii) The preparation of witness statements and expert reports can generate 
excessive costs. 
 
(xi) There is no effective control over pre-issue costs; certain pre-action protocols 
lead to magnification of these costs and duplication of effort. 
 
(xii) In some instances there is ineffective case management, both by the parties 
and by the court. 
 
(xiii) Some cases which ought to settle early settle too late or not at all. 
 
This research is primarily concerned with item (xiii) and the perception by NAH Ltd that 
defendant behaviour is a significant cause of excessive costs.  Lord Justice Jackson 
recommends that the recoverability of ATE insurance premiums should be abolished and 
one way costs shifting should be introduced.  However if defendant behaviour is a major 
factor and it is possible to identify the causes of this and take action to reduce their delay, or  
to modify processes such that any delay and increase in costs caused by their actions can 
be minimized, this has implications for any recommendations on excessive costs.  Insurers 
may, for example, be failing to investigate cases properly due to inadequacies in the 
information they collect and unaware of the impact that this has on costs and the timescales 
involved in determining cases.  Alternatively the very nature of processes may be such that 
there are inbuilt delays in types of cases that require addressing through procedural 
changes.   
 
This research therefore investigates defendant action on delay and subsequent costs in civil 
litigation with a focus on personal injury and clinical negligence and conducts an analysis of 
the level of delay and the impact on costs.  It examines the evidence considered by Jackson 
together with additional data supplied by NAH Ltd to reach conclusions on delay in certain 
circumstances in civil litigation.  The research primarily considers defendant actions and the 
impact of those actions and we make clear the distinction between defendant action and 
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defendant behaviour.  As data are not currently available on defendant behaviour, the 
causes of that behaviour or how defendant behaviour is affected by claimant behaviour we 
cannot at this stage draw any conclusions about behaviour.5  However it is possible to draw 
limited conclusions about defendant action in the context of the processing claims and 
litigation to resolve claims, especially where liability is denied or there are delays in admitting 
liability.   
 
This report attempts an analysis of both NAH data and data considered by Lord Justice 
Jackson; showing how they differ; how their similarities can lead to effective conclusions on 
delay and where new conclusions emerge on the causes of excessive or disproportionate 
costs. 
 
1.2. Research Outline 
 
The research was designed to achieve the following outcomes: 
 
• To identify the causes of excessive and disproportionate costs in personal injury and 
clinical negligence claims; 
 
• To consider the causes of excessive costs set out in Chapter 4, paragraph 3.1 of 
Lord Justice Jackson’s final report of costs in civil litigation and with reference 
specifically to new data supplied by NAH Ltd to examine whether defendant action is 
a contributor to costs, and if so, to what extent; 
 
• To analyse the data considered by Lord Justice Jackson (found at Appendices 1-28 
of his preliminary report) and where possible, examine whether this data supports his 
conclusions as to the causes of excessive costs; 
 
• To identify whether defendant delay results in quantifiable increased costs and, 
where possible, to draw conclusions on whether defendant delay in admitting liability 
contributes significantly to litigation costs; and 
 
• To identify whether defendant action is a factor which, if altered, has the potential to 
reduce both sides’ costs.  
 
                                                           
5 We consider that this is a separate piece of research work for which additional data are required. 
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The research tests the hypothesis that defendant action, specifically defendant caused 
delay, is a significant contributor to excessive costs in litigation.  The background to this 
research is the perception that defendant behaviour is a significant contributor to excessive 
costs.  In its response to Lord Justice Jackson’s preliminary report on civil litigation costs 
NAH Ltd identified defendant insurer behaviour and the nature and complexity of a case as 
the two most important factors in personal injury cases.6  In particular the response indicated 
that defendant insurers ‘dedicate insufficient resource for early investigation‘ and also that 
defendant insurance management fails to use effective risk management with the result that 
‘settlement of cases can be inordinately delayed – even when it is clear that liability rests 
with the defendant.’7 Increased costs are thus incurred when unnecessary work is carried out 
on a case when defendant insurers fail to admit liability early, but also when claimant 
solicitors are forced to chase defendants or issue court proceedings.  This extra activity adds 
to costs. 
 
In carrying out this research project we have considered a number of issues relating to the 
cause of excessive costs in civil litigation.  Lord Justice Jackson broadly identifies some 
possible causes of excessive and disproportionate costs in civil litigation and this research 
considers costs in the context of the proposed Jackson reforms.  However it is beyond the 
scope of this research to determine the precise underlying causes of defendant delay and 
the behaviour characteristics (and reasons) involved in delay (i.e. the reasons why cases are 
not investigated properly by defendant insurers or the other factors within the insurance 
industry that cause delay.)  To conduct such research would require behavioural analysis 
and the application of interpretive interactionism methodologies8 to examine not just the 
behaviour of defendant insurers within their established processes but also how claimant 
solicitor behaviour influences that behaviour and how claimant solicitor behaviour is itself a 
factor in delay which may give rise to additional costs.  While the perception of claimant 
solicitors may be that defendants use ‘delay and obfuscation as a tactic to encourage some 
claimants to give up on a legitimate claim’ and also delay admissions of liability ‘even in 
cases where liability is clear’9 the data made available for this research, even that data not 
                                                           
6 The National Accident Helpline (2009) National Accident Helpline: Response to the Preliminary 
Report of the Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Kettering: National Accident Helpline 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Denzin, N. (2001), Interpretive Interactionism (Applied Social Research Methods), London: Sage 
 
9 The National Accident Helpline (2009) National Accident Helpline: Response to the Preliminary Report 
of the Review of Civil Litigation Costs, Kettering: National Accident Helpline 
 
   
   
  
Lincoln Law School 7
considered by Jackson and provided by NAH lacks sufficient detail of behavioural factors or 
actions to allow such conclusions to be reached and supported by the data.  As a result, this 
research confines itself to examination of defendant action, and defendant delay as identified 
by the NAH data, and the impact of that action but makes recommendations for further 
research into defendant behaviour. 
 
Given the short period in which this research was conducted10 there are inevitably limitations 
on what could be achieved and we make no pretence that the research findings offer a 
comprehensive analysis of the problem of defendant action.  But we consider that the 
research aims have been broadly met and set out our reasoning below.     
                                                           
10 Dictated by the period allowed for a response to the MOJ consultation on implementing Jackson 
and the dates on which data were received.  
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The remit of this research is to examine the real causes of excessive and disproportionate 
costs in personal injury and clinical negligence claims and, in particular, to review the 
conclusions on costs contained in Lord Justice Jackson’s final report.  To achieve this, the 
research has examined the data considered by Jackson as detailed in the 28 Appendices to 
his preliminary report, and has sought to identify the causes and costs of delay in data 
supplied by the NAH Ltd which were not considered by Jackson.  The research has also 
evaluated the extent to which delays in resolving cases and the costs of delay contribute to 
the overall costs of civil litigant.   
 
Jackson identified sixteen general causes of costs and concluded that some cases which 
ought to settle early settle too late or not at all.  The perception that defendant delay is a 
cause of late settlement or failure to settle is one issue considered by this research which we 
consider is also linked to two other causes identified by Jackson; ineffective case 
management, and lack of effective control over costs and pre-action protocols.  We are 
aware of anecdotal evidence that defendant insurers’ delay in responding to certain tasks 
within the protocol and also that they fail to settle in many cases where early settlement is 
considered achievable by claimants.  While this research was not provided with evidence on 
which to draw conclusions about defendant behaviour, we have considered the extent and 
costs of defendant action and its contribution to excessive costs.  Having done so, we 
conclude that defendant action is a significant contributing factor in some 24% of cases 
considered by this research where that delay has been specifically recorded (i.e. the Jonah 
dataset) and that defendant delay (whatever its causes) can contribute significantly to costs 
in certain types of case.  
 
The evidence of the various datasets provided by the NAH indicates that there is a 
significant number of cases where settlement could have been achieved earlier and at a 
lower level of costs than was eventually incurred.  It is regrettably difficult to provide a 
precise figure for the number and type of cases where defendant delay is the primary factor 
because a range of factors can influence the delay of a case and the data available to us 
only records defendant delay and not the other causes of delay.  Thus we are unable to 
clearly assess the levels of, or quantify, court delay or claimant delay and their contribution 
to cases although we would recommend further research into these factors.  The nature of 
the contact with the defendant may also be a factor and the research lacked available data 
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on the tasks within the protocol or other points within the process at which defendant delay 
occurred.  Thus our conclusions are confined to an assessment of the impact of defendant 
action rather than behaviour.     
 
Having reviewed the data we consider that Jackson’s conclusions on the sixteen causes of 
excessive cost are broadly accurate albeit not clearly supported by the data that he presents 
in the Appendices to his preliminary report.  Jackson identifies that there is incentive on a 
lawyer under the current hourly paid cost system to increase litigation effort in order to 
increase recoverable cost.  However, in identifying that some cases that ought to settle early 
do not do so, he does not directly address the importance of defendant delay as a factor.  
This may be either because defendants do not marshal sufficient resources to come quickly 
to a view and then to terms of settlement or that initial offers made by defendants are 
routinely much lower than the ‘going rate’ thus producing delay before settlement happens, 
often at a higher rate.  This research has, however, identified that the cost of defendant 
delay is significantly higher than other delay in those cases where delay can be quantified.  
Across the 19,988 cases contained within a Jonah dataset our analysis indicates that 
defendant delay has an average cost of £57.83 per day compared to an average cost of 
£8.49 per day for other (unspecified) causes of delay.   
 
We thus conclude that defendant delay has an average cost six times higher than the 
average cost of other causes of delay with the potential to significantly increase costs the 
longer the delay continues.  If this were to be replicated across a larger number of cases it 
would indicate a significant level of excessive and disproportionate costs.  However, while 
we are unable to clearly identify the number of delay days across all datasets we are, when 
looking at those cases where defendants fail to admit liability early, able to estimate the 
contribution of defendant delay to the conduct and duration of cases in certain datasets. The 
data that we have examined shows that in cases where there is defendant delay such that 
settlement cannot be achieved and court action is taken to resolve a case, claimant solicitors 
win at court in 90% or higher of these cases indicating that defendant delay is a factor in 
increased court fees and the time taken to resolve cases.   
 
The evidence that we have reviewed as part of this research also indicates that in cases 
where there has been delay, the average costs exceed the average damages, such that at 
some levels average costs are more than double average damages.11 Cases thus may 
become uneconomical to pursue at certain value levels and case types and the anecdotal 
                                                           
11 See, for example Appendix 24 of Lord Justice Jackson’s Final Report 
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evidence suggests that this may be a tactical decision on the part of defendant insurers who 
seek to delay cases beyond the point where they are considered worthwhile pursuing.  As a 
result, claimants may be at the disadvantage of pursuing a case where both costs and the 
time involved are disproportionate.  We discuss the duration of cases within this research 
and propose further research into defendant behaviour with a view to identifying factors that 
determine defendant delay and mechanisms for resolving defendant delay. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This research was completed primarily by analysis of data in MS Excel 2007 together with 
examination and analysis of the policy conclusions drawn by Jackson in his preliminary 
report and final report.    
 
3.1. Jackson Data  
 
In his review of civil litigation Lord Justice Jackson considered a range of data on costs 
including court data, summary data from the Compensation Recovery Unit, several individual 
datasets on cases handled by liability insurers and a report on personal injury costs prepared 
by Frontier Economics and the Association of British Insurers (ABI).  As part of this research 
we have reviewed Jackson’s data to see what it reveals about costs and have also reviewed 
his findings on costs.   
 
We discuss our analysis and conclusions in Section 3 but note here that while Jackson’s 
data contains much useful information about the amount of costs and level of costs in certain 
case types, it reveals little about the causes of excessive costs.   
 
3.2. NAH Ltd data  
 
NAH Ltd provided data for analysis which included: 
  
• Allianz data - on 129,433 ATE Premiums with additional data on the operation of the ATE 
premium and the duration/completion of the case.  This included data where liability was 
admitted and provided for an analysis of the type of case and duration of cases; 
 
• Benchmarking Data – Jonah data on 4376 cases that had been to court and closed and 
the number of these cases that had been won together with approximately 20,000 cases 
where defendant delay had been recorded as part of the recording of protocol tasks – 
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this allowed for analysis of the average percentage of cases that are won (within the 
dataset) and which, by inference could have been settled earlier as well as an 
assessment of the extent of defendant delay and its overall contribution to costs.  From 
this data we also sought to quantify the cost of defendant delay; and  
 
• Firms Data – a smaller dataset containing data from firms covering a month’s worth of 
referrals sent out by NAH Ltd in November 2006.  We understand that the complete 
dataset consists of some 336 successful cases but at time of writing we appear to have 
received only detailed data on 87 of these cases and there are some data issues as 
outlined at Appendix 2.  We have however considered the summary of this data.   
 
In addition to this information we also examined NAH Ltd’s submission to the Jackson report 
and anecdotal evidence on the causes of delay in order to determine if the data supplied 
provided evidence to support the perceptions of defendant delay. 
 
 
4. THE JACKSON REVIEW 
 
 
Lord Woolf regarded delay as one of the fundamental problems of civil litigation and 
introduced two methods: the rationed procedural track (the Fast Track) and the managed 
procedure (The Multi-Track) which so far as litigation is concerned appear to have solved the 
problem with time from issue to trial dropping dramatically following the introduction of the 
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR).  His thesis was that case management in its prescriptive or 
individual approach would reduce delay, reduce litigation effort and, therefore, reduce cost. 
 
4.1. Jackson’s Data  
 
It should be noted that in his compendious review of the sixteen general causes of excessive 
costs Jackson does not specifically point to delay.12  Our analysis of the data contained 
within the 28 Appendices to the Jackson report concludes that the question of delay was not 
explicitly considered by Jackson in his review although some conclusions on the cause of 
costs are clearly based in part on the data collected and in part on a policy analysis. 
 
In our analysis we find certain Appendices useful in identifying the cause of excessive costs 
and others as unhelpful as follows: 
 
 
                                                           
12 Final Report paragraph 3.1 page 42 
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Useful/Unhelpful Appendix Numbers 
Useful 1,1b,2,7,8,9,23,24,26,27,28 
Unhelpful 3,4,5,6,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,25,29 
 
Appendix 1 and 2, for example, identify categorical factors in the duration and costs of a 
case.  The basic relationship demonstrated by the Jackson data is that the speed of a case 
has a significant impact on the costs.  Appendix 1 identifies as categorical factors: 
 
• Track (Fast/not allocated)  
• Type of Case (Contract/Personal Injury) 
 
Appendix 2 identifies as categorical factors: 
 
• Track (MT/FT)  for RTA13 (Jackson classes RTA as Personal Injury (PI)) 
• Type of Case (but has many more than 2 categories in this appendix) 
 
Perhaps most useful of the Jackson data is Appendix 24 whose table demonstrates that 
settlement costs effectively double when cases go to Post litigation for amounts up to 
£50,000.   However average damages up to £50,000 are the same whether settled at Pre or 
Post litigation.14  Jackson’s data here indicates that the problem of excessive costs is most 
prevalent at the lower end of the scale as follows: 
 
• in respect of cases with a value up to £5,000 the average damages (pre litigation) 
were £2,541.66 while the average costs were £4,262.17. For post litigation 
settlements the average damages were £2,748.32 while the average costs were 
£8,046.84.    
 
                                                           
13 We note here that Jackson classes RTA as Personal Injury (PI) and the categories used by Jackson 
are not directly comparable to the more helpful and comprehensive classifications contained in the 
NAH data. 
 
14 Note that no data are available in respect of Pre litigation for amounts from £50,000 upwards. 
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• in respect of cases with a value between £5,000 and £15,000 the average damages 
(pre litigation) were £8,215.78 while the average costs were £6,323.96. For post 
litigation settlements the average damages were £8,728.24 while the average costs 
were £11,637.24.      
 
Jackson’s data thus provides for a definition of ‘excessive’ costs where the costs involved in 
pursuing a damages award greatly exceed the amount of that award and are considered to 
be too high.15  But while Jackson acknowledges that some cases which ought to settle early 
settle too late or not at all, the data on which his conclusions are based does not provide 
direct evidence of the causes of delay, or even that delay leads to identifiable costs 
increases in all types of case or over specific durations.  Jackson does, however, explain 
that cases that fail to achieve an early settlement and which go to trial incur higher costs 
which Appendices 24 and 28 shows can greatly exceed the damages involved.  Appendix 28 
indicates that the claimed costs can exceed the paid costs by approximately 30% and that 
average legal costs are higher than damages in employment, personal injury and motor 
claims.  
 
Appendix 23 shows that the longer the time spent on trying to resolve the issue of costs, 
generally the lower the percentage saved in costs (Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Total Amount saved (%) vs. time taken to resolve costs (Jackson App. 23) 
 
While, predictably, time is a factor in the amount of costs involved and the generation of 
excessive or ‘disproportionate costs; Jackson’s data does not directly address the points at 
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which excessive costs are generated.  He acknowledges that ‘those litigants who wish the 
court to resolve their disputes are fully entitled to press on to trial’16 but does not directly 
address the use of court action as a means to deal with delay in settlement.  We address this 
later in this research as the data provided by NAH suggests that in the majority of cases 
where claimants take legal action they are successful.17  Thus if claimants are taking court 
action as a direct response to defendant delay (whether through inaction or as a deliberate 
tactic) a higher level of costs than is ‘necessary’ is being incurred, 
 
However, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) PIL has claimed that significant savings 
are being made in EL and Pl success fees and that this is in part because success fees are 
‘usually proportional’ to base costs, hence a reduction in base costs (basic legal fees) leads 
to a reduction in success fees.18  Thus if base costs are incurred because of the lack of 
incentive to control costs then there is potential for ‘excessive’ costs to be routinely incurred 
where delay or at least lack of timely action results in increased activity which pushes fees 
up.    
 
The Appendix 23 data19 shows high average levels of costs as percentage of damages.  In 
2007 the figure was 227% for files with a value of £0 - £15,000 while in 2008 it was 218%.20   
 
 
 
4.2. Jackson’s Conclusions on Costs  
 
Lord Justice Jackson has found that excess cost remains a problem. In personal injury 
cases, particularly lower value cases, it is only claimant costs that are relevant because they 
are and will remain recoverable from a party not in a contractual relationship with the 
claiming lawyer.  Defendant costs do not attract the same attention because they are not 
recoverable from another party except in rare cases and even then ATE gives cost 
protection.  Further, they are subject to stiff competitive market pressures in the context of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
15 Final Report paragraph 1.2 page 40 
 
16 Final Report paragraph 3.32, page 49 
 
17 We do, however, note that this conclusion may not necessarily be replicated across all datasets and 
base this conclusion solely on the data provided to us for this research.  
 
18 Jackson Preliminary Report, Appendix 28 
19 Appendix 23 - Two years of data from a liability insurer 
 
20 We note however that the sample size was higher in 2008 (247) than in 2007 (182). 
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the contract between repeat players (insurers and self insured parties) and lawyers.21  The 
Jackson solution for lower value litigation is to introduce fixed costs generally and qualified 
one way cost shifting in personal injury cases.  In other words, in low value personal injury 
cases where the claimant wins then his costs are recoverable on a fixed cost basis and the 
cost protection offered by this system removes the need for ATE protection and, it follows, 
the need for it to be recoverable. 
 
The rationale for this approach which must necessarily also take into account another Woolf 
principle of ‘equality of arms’ is that fixed costs represent a fair reward for the claimant 
lawyer and are neither too low to force the lawyer to skimp work and, perhaps, increase the 
danger of under-settlement, nor too high, thus creating over-reward.  If this approach is 
adopted by the Ministry of Justice, particularly in the context of personal injury cases, it is 
clear that the question of delay re-enters the discussion for two reasons,  
 
Firstly, if the view is taken that the historic recoverable costs, on which fixed costs are likely 
to be based, represent arguably excessive claimant hourly paid costs and that fixed costs 
will drive that excess out of the system it is necessary to be certain what the cause of the 
excess is. It may, of course, be because of the incentive on a lawyer under the current hourly 
paid cost system to increase litigation effort in order to increase recoverable cost.  (This is 
certainly Jackson’s view – see Jackson Final Report paragraph 3.2.3, page 47) It may, for 
example, be caused by delay brought about by inefficiencies produced by the court system, 
or procedural rules.  It may be caused by defendant delay either because defendants do not 
marshal sufficient resources to come quickly to a view and then to terms of settlement or that 
initial offers made by defendants are routinely much lower than the ‘going rate’ thus 
producing delay before settlement happens, often at a higher rate. In order to ascertain an 
appropriate rate for fixed costs these various causes of delay must be clearly identified and 
costed and either eliminated or if this is not possible allowed for in a fair rate. 
 
Secondly, if delay (particularly defendant delay in the pre-issue, pre litigation phase), outside 
judicial case management remains in the system post fixed costs (when claimant lawyers no 
longer have an economic incentive to delay) then the danger of under-settlement may be 
present if this delay exhausts the claimant lawyer’s ability to continue with the case and may 
force claimant lawyers either to skimp the work or encourage under-settlement. 
 
                                                           
21 Of course in some cases, often behind the veil, one defendant will recover costs from a co-
defendant or contributor but the quantum of these costs rarely is the subject of public dispute. 
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It follows that in low value claims, particularly lower value personal injury cases, it is 
necessary to examine all causes of delay and come to a conclusion as to whether  the 
introduction of fixed recoverable costs, at any particular rate, will drive in efficiencies on both 
sides or leave claimant’s vulnerable and justice not served.  This report addresses one key 
issue in pre-issue personal injury cases − defendants’ delays which, if found, are likely to be 
highly relevant in the period prior to the involvement of the court. 
 
 
 
5. DELAY AND EXCESSIVE OR DISPROPORTIONATE COSTS 
 
As outlined above, Jackson indicates that the duration and complexity of cases has an 
impact on excessive and disproportionate costs.  He indicates that hourly paid lawyers lack 
incentive to deal with cases quickly and that this and procedural inefficiency impacts 
negatively on speedy resolution of cases.  Jackson is, however, silent on specific reasons for 
delay in cases that should be settled early, while the NAH Ltd and others have commented 
that defendant delay is a significant factor in excessive costs. 
 
Thompson’s Solicitors (2009) suggest that delay is endemic in the insurance industry and 
can be a tactical practice, stating that: 
 
A whole industry is built around complex claims strategies designed to best 
advance their interests.  For some insurers this can mean trying to act fairly 
and reasonably – turning the cases over rather than instinctively trying to 
block them or reduce them in value.  Sadly in Thomsons’ experience for too 
many it means strategies including claims capture (designed to deprive 
victims of legal advice), the use of aggressive negotiation tactics through loss 
adjusters or otherwise, attrition based strategies such as delays and failure to 
reply to correspondence.22    
 
Thompsons also suggest that: 
 
The net result is that whereas in a typical small claim it is unusual for the 
parties to instruct lawyers, insurers in PI claims frequently dig in and contest 
the case as a matter of course, whatever their value and with disproportionate 
resources.  They fight technical points and instruct both solicitors and counsel.  
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The calculation may be that whilst it is disproportionate to incur such costs in 
some cases, the insurers benefit from the many other cases where the 
Claimant faced with this show of force gives up or undersettles to conclude 
the matter quickly.23    
 
The data supplied by NAH Ltd for this research allows for evaluation of the extent of delay 
(as defined by the data) across a range of cases and some indication of the cost of 
defendant delay as a proportion of the total delay cost and as a factor in specific types of 
case.  However there are some limitations in the data which impact on the feasibility of 
assessing the significance of defendant delay as an overall contributor to excessive costs.24  
However, we have considered defendant delay in respect of its impact on the duration of 
cases, the action required to be taken in cases and the cost of cases. 
 
5.1. Duration  
 
The duration of a claim can be a significant factor in the overall cost as process or settlement 
failures can mean that cases simply take too long to resolve and incur additional and 
disproportionate costs. 
 
We examined 129,433 records, 43,608 of which (33.69%) contained a confirmed date on 
which liability was admitted. Three Duration fields were created :  
 
WONPAID DATE – DATE OF COVER (WPD- COVER)   (a) 
NCSH LIABILITY DATE – DATE OF COVER (LAD – COVER)  (b) 
WONPAID DATE – NCSH LIABILITY DATE (WPD-LAD)   (c) 
 
A ratio of (b)/(a) converts (b) into the percentage of time spent on (a)’s duration. Mean 
durations (days) for a, b and c, with the percentage of time spent until Liability admitted are 
shown below (Table 1) : 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22 Thompsons Solicitors (2009) Civil Litigation Costs Review: Thompsons Solicitors response to the 
Interim Report 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 See Appendix 2 for detail on the limitations of the available data.  
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Mean durations 
(n=43,608) 
Average of 
 WPD-COVER 
Average of  
WPD-LAD 
Average of  
LAD-COVER 
Average of 
(LAD-Cover)/ 
(WPD-Cover) 
Ncsh Liability 
Admitted 547 331 216 37.1% 
(blank records) 647    
Grand Total 613 331 216 37.1% 
 
Table 1 : Mean duration (Wonpaid date – Date of Cover, Wonpaid date – Liability Admitted 
date, Liability Admitted date - Cover date) and Percentage of time spent on LAD-Cover 
relative to WPD-Cover.  
 
The following Table 2 shows the analysis for those records which have an incident date and 
a Closed policy date, but they are categorised by the years that the policy started. 
 
Year 
started 
Count of 
Policy No. 
Mean 
Average 
duration 
Max of  
duration 
St. Deviation 
of duration 
Records 
Missing 
a 
CLOSED 
date 
2005 19977 835 6021 458 133 
2006 20842 774 4987 414 742 
2007 22487 699 5782 374 2237 
2008 25208 582 5518 325 7055 
2009 19497 467 6029 293 15394 
2010 5417 320 1929 273 32945 
Grand 
Total 113428 653 6029 399 58506 
Table 2 : For years the policy started, durations of Incident date to Closed date (days). 
 
The mean averages (overall mean = 653 days) and the maximum durations (overall mean 
6029) are reasonably similar across the years.   The mean duration decreased steadily year-
on-year from 835 days in 2005 (n=19,977) to 320 days in 2010 (n=5417), a decrease overall 
of 78.1%.  However, the Incident dates can be as old as the 1950s, which increases these 
summary durations.25  
 
5.2. Defendant Contributions to Delay  
 
The evidence that we have reviewed indicates that defendant action is a contributor to delay 
in certain circumstances.  The NAH Ltd Jonah data (19,988 cases) shows that 88% of these 
cases are not completed to the due date.  In the 19,988 cases, 12,897 of which have actually 
                                                           
25 It should also be noted that some 58,000 records did not contain one of the two required dates. 
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finished, the data provides an indicator of the average Total delay and the average total 
defendant delay (Table 3). 
 
 
     
 
Count of  
Case Id 
Average of   
Total Delay 
Days 
Average of   
Defendant Delay 
Days 
Average of   
Value (£) 
Finish Ontime or 
early 2396 -84 29 
2293 
(11.99%) 
Finish Late 17592 375 49 
2776 
(88.01%) 
Grand Total 19988 320 47 
2718 
(100.00%) 
 
Table 3 : Defendant Delay days and Total Delay dates categorised by whether late or 
finishing on time or early, with mean value (£) 
 
Our analysis suggests that 24% of cases are delayed due to defendant action but also that 
the extent of defendant delay varies.  Thus, it is not possible to suggest that defendant delay 
is a significant factor in all cases, especially in the absence of data concerning the other 
causes of delay. 
 
 
 Values    
Row Labels 
Average of 
Total Delay 
Days 
Average of 
Defendant Delay 
Days 
Average of  
Value(£) 
Count of  
Case Id 
Null records 338 70 2485 
7091 
(35.48%) 
 Finished 310 34 2846 
12897 
(64.52%) 
Grand Total 320 47 2718 19988 
 
Table 4 : Mean of Total Delay days and Defendant Delay days and their relationship to their 
corresponding mean value (£) 
 
In cases where defendant delay is such that court action is taken to try and resolve the issue 
and/or force a settlement the claimant wins in better than 85% of cases across the Jonah 
dataset.  Examination of a total of 4376 cases from 20 firms showed that in 3864 cases the 
firms won when taking the case to court, a success rate of 90%.    
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5.3 The Cost of Delay  
 
The cost of delay across the datasets provided by NAH has also been considered both in 
terms of the impact that early admission of liability has on ATE premiums (£) and increases 
in the time taken to pursue a case (table 5).    
 
 
Liability 
Discount   
Track Description No Yes 
Grand 
Total 
Group Actions - Non Liability 
Admitted    
Count of Policy No. 5  5 
Average of Premium (£) 227395  227395 
Non-RTA Fast Track    
Count of Policy No. 85606 22923 108529 
Average of Premium (£) 1213 575 1078 
Non-RTA Multi Track    
Count of Policy No. 1621 3 1624 
Average of Premium (£) 2484 604 2481 
RTA Fast Track    
Count of Policy No. 25792 35080 60872 
Average of Premium (£) 419 324 364 
RTA Multi Track    
Count of Policy No. 881 32 913 
Average of Premium (£) 2293 336 2224 
Total Count of Policy No. 113905 58038 171943 
Total Average of Premium (£) 1070 423 852 
 
Table 5 : Mean premium for all Track Descriptions and whether Liability Discounted 
(Yes/No). 
 
Table 5 shows that the 58,038 policies with Liability Discount have mean values much lower 
than if there is no Liability Discount. For example, with non-RTA Fast Track (n = 108,529 
policies), the mean premium with Liability Discount is £575 but the mean without Liability 
Discount is £1213, about twice as expensive.    
 
With RTA Multi-track, the increase is about 6 times as great (£2293 against £336), though 
based on only 913 policies in total.  Further analysis of this data allows for identification of 
the average value of defendant delay per day (Table 6) as follows:  
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 Values    
Row Labels 
Value (£) per 
single Total 
Delay Day 
Value (£) per 
single 
Defendant 
Delay Day 
Average of  
Value(£) 
Count of  
Case Id 
Null records 7.35 35.50 2485 
7091 
(35.48%) 
Finished 9.18 83.71 2846 
12897 
(64.52%) 
Grand Total 8.49 57.83 2718 19988 
 
Table 6 : Indicator variable for End date (End date has a Null value or is finished) 
 
We note (Table 6), therefore, that the average value of defendant delay is £57.83 per day, 
significantly higher than the general cost of delay £8.49.  However, the data provided does 
not record the other costs of delay and this is an area on which further research is needed.  
If, for example, claimant solicitor actions are a factor (which can be inferred from the data if 
all delay is not due to the defendant) then this is also a cost of delay albeit one that 
generates lower costs than defendant delay.   
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The evidence that we have analysed as part of this research indicates that defendant delay 
is a significant factor in excessive costs, at least in some cases.  Jackson identified the 
failure to settle cases early as one factor in excessive and disproportionate costs and also 
identified failures in case management and the lack of incentive for speedy action as factors 
that could result in excessive and disproportionate costs.  We broadly endorse these 
conclusions but consider that there is a link between delay and excessive costs that needs to 
be explicitly considered in any changes to the costs regime given Jackson’s conclusions that 
the time taken to resolve cases has an impact on excessive and disproportionate costs, and 
our own analysis of delay as recorded by the NAH Ltd data.    
 
Jackson concluded, for example, that for every £1.00 for which the liability insurers paid out 
in damages, they paid out £1.80 in claimant costs.  We have verified this figure in Jackson’s 
data but our analysis of the NAH Ltd data supplied as part of this research indicates that the 
amount of costs incurred is not only linked to the overall time taken to pursue a case to 
conclusion but also to the amount of defendant delay involved.  Based on the evidence of 
one dataset where the extent of defendant delay is recorded our analysis indicates that 
defendant delay has an average daily cost of £57.83 compared to an average daily cost of 
£8.49 for other (unspecified) causes of delay.  While we would urge caution in quoting these 
figures as an average across the industry, unless it is possible to replicate this across a 
   
   
  
Lincoln Law School 22
larger dataset26, this at least provides an indication of the average higher costs of defendant 
delay. 
 
We also conclude that defendant delay is a factor in adding unnecessary court costs to 
cases where there is a failure to reach a settlement and court action is taken as a means of 
resolving the case or forcing a settlement.  Unfortunately because the point at which delay 
takes place and court action is subsequently taken is not recorded in the data, we are unable 
to quantify this.  But we note that claimants succeed in 90% of the cases that proceed to 
court and this indicates unnecessary fees and time spent on progressing a case which can 
arguably be attributed to defendant failure to settle.    
 
We therefore recommend further research into the causes of delay and defendant behaviour 
specifically to determine whether endemic practices within the insurance industry cause 
delay or whether insurers’ responses are determined by claimant behaviour, and to 
determine the key points at which delay occurs within the protocol. If successful such 
research could identify whether changes to the handling of cases will reduce excessive and 
disproportionate costs.  Our outline proposal for this research is contained at Appendix 3. 
 
 
7. QUERIES 
 
 
Any queries concerning this draft report or any aspect of this research should be directed to: 
 
Angus Nurse 
Research Fellow 
Lincoln Law School 
University of Lincoln 
Brayford Pool 
Lincoln, LN6 7TS 
 
Email: anurse@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
                                                           
26 To provide a meaningful analysis we agree with the APIL’s suggestion of 10% of all claims – see 
Jackson Appendix 28. 
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Appendix 1 – Summary of Data Analysis 
Our analysis of the different datasets sought to determine the average durations of cases, the 
extent to which defendant delay impacted on these durations and, where possible, the cost of 
defendant delay in relation to ‘other’ delay such that we would be able to determine if defendant 
delay were a significant factor in the overall duration and cost of a case.27   For example, 
Defendant Contribution-2 dataset (Jonah data) as below to show the impact of the 2 protocols. 
 
Defendant Contribution 2 dataset has 106,423 Case IDs with these fields 
Firm  Case Id  Acknowledgment Days  Detailed Liability Days  Value 
 
Out of which we generated 2 Indicator variables….. 
Firm 
 Case 
Id  Acknow Days Acknow (-1, 1,2)  Detailed Liability Days DetLibDay (-1,1,2)  Value (£) 
 
There are some measures of success quantified or noted in this dataset i.e. those achieving 
the protocols of 21 days or 90 days and the associated mean values (£). Table 1 (below) 
shows the quantities. 
 
Detailed Liability 
days   
Acknowledgment days 
 Null 
records 
 90 days 
or less 
(inside 
the 
protocol) 
 (91 
days 
or 
more) 
Grand 
Total 
 Null records     
Count of  Case Id 69749 63 6 69818 
Average of  Detailed Liability 
Days #DIV/0! 1 217 19 
Average of  Acknow Days #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
Average of  Value (£) 568 1656 2084 569 
 0-21 days (inside the protocol)     
Count of  Case Id 3119 28171 1942 33232 
Average of  Detailed Liability 
Days #DIV/0! 2 221 16 
Average of  Acknow Days 2 0 2 0 
Average of  Value (£) 1681 2734 2307 2611 
22 days or more (outside the 
protocol)     
Count of  Case Id 1067 876 1430 3373 
Average of  Detailed Liability 
Days #DIV/0! 51 186 135 
                                                           
27 Defendant delay was pre-recorded in certain of the datasets provided to us and we have used this field in our 
analysis 
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Average of  Acknow Days 72 57 124 90 
Average of  Value (£) 2016 1907 2059 2006 
Total Count of  Case Id 73935 29110 3378 106423 
Total Average of  Detailed 
Liability Days #DIV/0! 3 206 25 
Total Average of  Acknow Days 20 2 54 9 
Total Average of  Value (£) 636 2707 2202 1254 
 
We also examined data on the type of case to see if it was possible to draw conclusions on 
delay and costs in specific types of cases.  
 
Case Type (n=30 categories including the blanks) summary, sorted by size  
 
Count of Policy No    
Case Type Description Total % 
ACCIDENT AT WORK 47005 27.3 
SLIP OR TRIP 27606 16.1 
RTA – DRIVER 26596 15.5 
RTA – PASSENGER 25986 15.1 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY 23761 13.8 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST 9055 5.3 
OTHER 6453 3.8 
PUBLIC LIABILITY 2205 1.3 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1267 0.7 
IND. DISEASE – DEAFNESS 544 0.3 
IND. DISEASE- RSI 320 0.2 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 313 0.2 
IND. DISEASE – MESOTHELIOMA 185 0.1 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 174 0.1 
IND. DISEASE – OTHER 153 0.1 
IND. DISEASE – VWF 73 0.0 
(blank) 67 0.0 
RTA - PRE FEB '04 42 0.0 
IND. DISEASE – DERMATITIS 34 0.0 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL 
THICKENING 33 0.0 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 23 0.0 
ASTHMA 19 0.0 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES 6 0.0 
IND. DISEASE – ASBESTOSIS 6 0.0 
IND. DISEASE – LEGIONNAIRE 5 0.0 
GROUP ACTIONS 4 0.0 
IND DISEASE – CANCER 3 0.0 
IND. DISEASE – BURSITIS 2 0.0 
BULLYING 2 0.0 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 1 0.0 
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Grand Total 171943 100.0 
 
The 5 largest Case Types account for 87.8% of the volume of claims. Table 6 shows that 
RTA –Driver and RTA-Passenger have low mean premium values of £396 and £364 
respectively.  Typically, these 2 categories have mean premium levels about 2.5 to 3 times 
lower than the other 3 major categories (Accident at work, Slip or trip and Occupier Liability). 
 
 Values  
Row Labels 
Count of Policy 
No. 
Average of Premium 
(£) 
ACCIDENT AT WORK 47005 1046 
SLIP OR TRIP 27606 1118 
RTA – DRIVER 26596 396 
RTA – PASSENGER 25986 364 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY 23761 1106 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST 9055 458 
OTHER 6453 1042 
PUBLIC LIABILITY 2205 1341 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1267 1137 
IND. DISEASE - DEAFNESS 544 1792 
IND. DISEASE- RSI 320 2287 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 313 4323 
IND. DISEASE - MESOTHELIOMA 185 2024 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 174 1883 
IND. DISEASE – OTHER 153 2030 
IND. DISEASE – VWF 73 2332 
(blank) 67 1274 
RTA - PRE FEB '04 42 367 
IND. DISEASE - DERMATITIS 34 1807 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL 
THICKENING 33 2591 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 23 2362 
ASTHMA 19 2171 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES 6 2400 
IND. DISEASE - ASBESTOSIS 6 2567 
IND. DISEASE - LEGIONNAIRE 5 1359 
GROUP ACTIONS 4 52325 
IND DISEASE – CANCER 3 2583 
IND. DISEASE - BURSITIS 2 3750 
BULLYING 2 2050 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 1 2000 
Grand Total 171943 852 
 
Table : Mean premium (£) by Type of case (sorted by number of policies from 
largest to smallest)
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Case Type x Track Description cross tab 
 
Count of Policy No Track Description    
Case Type Description 
Group 
Actions - 
Non 
Liability 
Admitted 
Non-RTA 
Fast Track 
Non-RTA 
Multi Track 
RTA 
Fast 
Track 
RTA 
Multi 
Track 
Grand 
Total 
ACCIDENT AT WORK  46276 696 33  47005 
ASTHMA  13 6   19 
BULLYING   2   2 
GROUP ACTIONS 4     4 
IND DISEASE – CANCER   3   3 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL THICKENING 2 31   33 
IND. DISEASE – ASBESTOSIS  1 5   6 
IND. DISEASE – BURSITIS  1 1   2 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 1    1 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 11 12   23 
IND. DISEASE – DEAFNESS  518 26   544 
IND. DISEASE – DERMATITIS  28 6   34 
IND. DISEASE – LEGIONNAIRE  4 1   5 
IND. DISEASE – MESOTHELIOMA 4 181   185 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER  75 78   153 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 18 156   174 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES  6   6 
IND. DISEASE – VWF  57 16   73 
IND. DISEASE- RSI  257 63   320 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY  23574 166 21  23761 
OTHER  6357 60 36  6453 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 1 311 1   313 
PRODUCT LIABILITY  1247 17 3  1267 
PUBLIC LIABILITY  2192 13   2205 
RTA – DRIVER  8  26309 279 26596 
RTA – PASSENGER  9 3 25677 297 25986 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST  6  8728 321 9055 
RTA - PRE FEB '04    37 5 42 
SLIP OR TRIP  27535 64 6 1 27606 
(blank)  24 11 22 10 67 
Grand Total 5 108529 1624 60872 913 171943 
 
Table above explodes into Table below to include mean Premium 
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Average of Premium (£) Track Description    
Case Type 
Group Actions 
- Non Liability 
Admitted 
Non-RTA 
Fast Track 
Non-
RTA 
Multi 
Track 
RTA Fast 
Track 
RTA Multi 
Track 
Grand 
Total 
ACCIDENT AT WORK  1020 2748 385  1046 
ASTHMA  1888 2783   2171 
BULLYING   2050   2050 
GROUP ACTIONS 52325     52325 
IND DISEASE - CANCER   2583   2583 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL THICKENING 2388 2604   2591 
IND. DISEASE - ASBESTOSIS  3000 2480   2567 
IND. DISEASE - BURSITIS  3000 4500   3750 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 2000    2000 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 2630 2117   2362 
IND. DISEASE - DEAFNESS  1764 2356   1792 
IND. DISEASE - DERMATITIS  1658 2504   1807 
IND. DISEASE - LEGIONNAIRE  1299 1600   1359 
IND. DISEASE - MESOTHELIOMA 1813 2029   2024 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER  1942 2116   2030 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 2177 1849   1883 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES  2400   2400 
IND. DISEASE - VWF  2315 2396   2332 
IND. DISEASE- RSI  2136 2903   2287 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY  1094 2845 377  1106 
OTHER  1034 2292 370  1042 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 927675 1350 2700   4323 
PRODUCT LIABILITY  1127 2005 543  1137 
PUBLIC LIABILITY  1333 2683   1341 
RTA - DRIVER  864  375 2376 396 
RTA - PASSENGER  604 0 345 2082 364 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST  1011  392 2241 458 
RTA - PRE FEB '04    367 370 367 
SLIP OR TRIP  1117 1923 383 1650 1118 
(blank)  1028 2361 379 2639 1274 
Grand Total 227395 1078 2481 364 2224 852 
 
Table : Mean premium (£) for Case Type by Track Description 
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Case Type x Liability discount cross tab 
    
Count of Policy No Liability Discount   
Case Type Description No Yes 
Grand 
Total 
ACCIDENT AT WORK 34465 12540 47005 
SLIP OR TRIP 23354 4252 27606 
RTA – DRIVER 16997 9599 26596 
RTA - PASSENGER 2335 23651 25986 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY 19025 4736 23761 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST 7254 1801 9055 
OTHER 5369 1084 6453 
PUBLIC LIABILITY 2096 109 2205 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1049 218 1267 
IND. DISEASE - DEAFNESS 544  544 
IND. DISEASE- RSI 320  320 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 294 19 313 
IND. DISEASE - MESOTHELIOMA 185  185 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 174  174 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER 152 1 153 
IND. DISEASE - VWF 73  73 
(blank) 58 9 67 
RTA - PRE FEB '04 25 17 42 
IND. DISEASE - DERMATITIS 32 2 34 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL 
THICKENING 33  33 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 23  23 
ASTHMA 19  19 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES 6  6 
IND. DISEASE - ASBESTOSIS 6  6 
IND. DISEASE - LEGIONNAIRE 5  5 
GROUP ACTIONS 4  4 
IND DISEASE - CANCER 3  3 
IND. DISEASE - BURSITIS 2  2 
BULLYING 2  2 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 1  1 
Grand Total 113905 58038 171943 
 
Table above explodes into Table below to include mean Premium 
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Liability Discount 
(N, Y)     
 N  Y  
Total 
Average of 
Premium (£) 
Total  
Count of 
Policy 
No. 
Case Type 
Average 
of 
Premium 
(£) 
Count 
of 
Policy 
No. 
Average 
of 
Premium 
(£) 
Count of 
 Policy No.  
ACCIDENT AT WORK 1216 34465 577 12540 1046 47005 
ASTHMA 2171 19   2171 19 
BULLYING 2050 2   2050 2 
GROUP ACTIONS 52325 4   52325 4 
IND DISEASE - CANCER 2583 3   2583 3 
IND DISEASE - PLEURAL 
THICKENING 2591 33   2591 33 
IND. DISEASE - ASBESTOSIS 2567 6   2567 6 
IND. DISEASE - BURSITIS 3750 2   3750 2 
IND. DISEASE - CARPAL TUNNEL 2000 1   2000 1 
IND. DISEASE - CHEST DISORDERS 2362 23   2362 23 
IND. DISEASE - DEAFNESS 1792 544   1792 544 
IND. DISEASE - DERMATITIS 1881 32 625 2 1807 34 
IND. DISEASE - LEGIONNAIRE 1359 5   1359 5 
IND. DISEASE - MESOTHELIOMA 2024 185   2024 185 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER 2040 152 625 1 2030 153 
IND. DISEASE - OTHER ASBESTOS 1883 174   1883 174 
IND. DISEASE - PLEURAL PLAQUES 2400 6   2400 6 
IND. DISEASE - VWF 2332 73   2332 73 
IND. DISEASE- RSI 2287 320   2287 320 
OCCUPIER LIABILITY 1239 19025 570 4736 1106 23761 
OTHER 1135 5369 583 1084 1042 6453 
PACKAGE TRAVEL LITIGATION 4571 294 499 19 4323 313 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1255 1049 569 218 1137 1267 
PUBLIC LIABILITY 1385 2096 500 109 1341 2205 
RTA – DRIVER 442 16997 314 9599 396 26596 
RTA - PASSENGER 724 2335 329 23651 364 25986 
RTA - PEDESTRIAN/CYCLIST 493 7254 318 1801 458 9055 
RTA - PRE FEB '04 389 25 336 17 367 42 
SLIP OR TRIP 1218 23354 572 4252 1118 27606 
(blank) 1417 58 354 9 1274 67 
Grand Total 1070 113905 423 58038 852 171943 
 
Table : Mean premium (£) for Case Type by Liability Discount 
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Appendix 2 – Data limitations and Analysis issues 
In considering the Allianz, Benchmarking (by CD), and Jonah (3 Defendant Contributions) 
datasets which seem to originate from 3 mutually exclusive databases, quite critically we were 
not able to integrate 2 or more datasets by Policy Number or Case ID in Excel 2007. Further, 
the late provision of the Solicitor Reference did not help us to proceed into a more complete 
analysis. 
To progress any further with this work we would require datasets where the key field e.g. policy 
ID/case ID/Solicitor reference ID, will contain data from all the fields from across all the Excel 
datasets. Hopefully, such records will provide cross-tabulation and statistical analysis from an 
integrated dataset. 
For example, if merging 2 of the Jonah datasets and the Benchmarking dataset : 
Def. contribution 1 fields (19,988 Case IDs) : 
Firm 
 Case Id 
 File Reference 
 Start Date 
 End Date 
 Required Finish Date Days 
 Planned Due Date 
 Total Delay Days 
 Defendant Delay Days 
 Value 
 
Def. contribution 2 fields (106,423 Case IDs) : 
Firm 
 Case Id 
 File Reference 
 Acknowledgment Days 
 Detailed Liability Days 
 Value 
 
Benchmarking data (171,943 records) : 
The fields in the Benchmarking dataset offer data about Dates of Incident, Cover going live 
and Closing the policy. The expectation is that the proportions of the entire timescale and the 
cost/value could be quantified more relevantly, making use of the matching of relevant 
categorical variables, such as Track Description, Cover Year, Liability Discount, that exist in 
other datasets too.  
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It will probably create a larger number of records in this new dataset than e.g. the 171,000 
records in the  Benchmarking dataset, and there may be ‘missing data’ (Null fields) but the 
relationships of interest in the data are not being fully explored as the Excel datasets are, to use 
a cliché, ‘not talking to each other’. In the merging of 3 datasets, some of the fields will, of 
course, contain the same data values e.g. Value (£) should be the same in both datasets for the 
same Case ID, which is what you would expect in an integrated database. 
To enable us to assume that the integrated dataset is ‘correct’ and from a quality control 
perspective, the merging should be managed by the client. It would be catastrophic if we were 
to mismatch the merging and present incorrect analysis.  
 
Defendant behaviour 
No numerical data was provided on this important aspect of the research so as to be able to 
make suitable inferences, as a result we confined our analysis to defendant action.  
 
The following synopsis of the provided datasets concentrates on the data and the factual, 
and pinpoints some aspects of the processing of that data into information that can be 
presented in tables or diagrams with suitable confidence. 
 
 
Allianz dataset 1 
Statistical calculations were permitted using cross-tabulations by categorical fields (e.g. Case 
Type description, Track description) and numerical calculations on durations (e.g. Ncsh Liab 
Admitted date, Wonpaid date and Date of Cover). This dataset did not provide defendant 
delay or delay costs data.  
Durations were calculated between the 3 dates and the ratio of duration spent until Liability 
admitted, but this was only available on one third of the policies.  No sense of defendant 
delay, causes of delay or behaviour emerged in these calculations. 
 
Allianz dataset 2 
 
In the ‘Case duration’ and ‘Opponents Costs’ worksheets, statistical calculations were 
permitted using cross-tabulations by categorical fields (e.g. Case Type Description, Track 
Type) and numerical calculations on durations were permitted (e.g. Ncsh Liab Admitted date, 
Wonpaid date and Date of Cover). These datasets did not provide defendant delay or delay 
costs data.  
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Durations were calculated between the 3 dates and the ratio of duration spent until Liability 
admitted.  
No sense of defendant delay, causes of delay or behaviour emerged in these calculations. 
 
Allianz dataset 3 
 
We were given 50 records of the November 2006 survey and then another dataset with 64 
records (from Stamp Jackson and Procter). In 37 of these latter records there was no Policy 
Number.  
No data on defendant delay, causes of delay or behaviour emerged in these calculations.  
A further Excel file was provided with data on 336 won cases (‘Jackson returns file’). There 
was no raw data on the 336 cases on which to compile statistical calculations and the many 
worksheets appeared to have been previously analysed. No data on defendant delay, 
causes of delay or behaviour emerged in these worksheets. 
 
 
Benchmarking data 
Statistical calculations concentrated on file  ‘Backup data for Jon discount rates’ which 
permitted cross-tabulations by categorical fields (e.g. Track Description, Liability Discount, 
Case Type description, Post 30 April) and numerical calculations on durations (e.g. Policy 
Closed Date – Cover Live date) and Premium value (£). This dataset did not provide 
defendant delay or delay costs. None of the other Excel files on the CD seem to help with 
such calculations. 
Durations were calculated around the 3 dates of : Closed date, Date of cover and Incident 
date. No sense of defendant delay, causes of delay or behaviour emerged in these 
calculations. 
Jonah data 
Statistical calculations in the file ‘Defendant Contribution-1’ were not permitted using cross-
tabulations by categorical fields (e.g. Track Description, Liability Discount, Case Type 
description) but important numerical calculations on durations were possible (e.g. Total delay 
days, Defendant Delay days) and were directly linked to Value by each Case ID.  
Statistical calculations in the file ‘Defendant Contribution-2’ were not permitted using cross-
tabulations by categorical fields (e.g. Track Description, Liability Discount, Case Type 
description) but important numerical calculations on durations were possible (e.g. 
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Acknowledgement days, Detailed Liability days) and were directly linked to Value by each 
Case ID. Analysis was especially possible on durations and value, both inside and outside 
the 21 day and 90 day protocols. 
Statistical calculations in the file ‘Defendant Contribution-3’ were limited to crude rates of 
success in cases won and lost. No cross-tabulations by categorical fields or numerical 
calculations on durations were possible.  
Where Null fields were recorded in the data, they were easily categorised and separated away 
from cases where full data was apparent. This has the obvious implication that we are cautious 
about representation in the dataset and being able to compile high quality inferences and 
summary information. 
However, despite the Null records there may still be residual data on dates, durations etc.. 
Lack of a clear field on which we could attempt comparative analysis i.e. the various datasets 
lack a single indicator from which we could complete an integrated analysis with a consistent 
framework and definition across the Allianz, Jonah and benchmarking datasets.. 
The Jonah dataset was the most useful, from which we could clearly identify defendant delay 
days and calculate the average value of defendant delay days.   
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Appendix 3 – Defendant Behaviour: Possible Further Research 
NAH Ltd has identified a further research question, namely: 
Is it possible to conclude that it is within the Defendants’ power to significantly reduce  
both sides’ costs by behavioural changes? 
Following analysis of the current datasets, we consider that it is beyond the scope of this 
research to reach such a conclusion as the current data provides information on defendant 
actions but not defendant behaviour.  As a result, any conclusions are limited to looking at 
the effect of defendant actions, where these are recorded, and where the data allows for 
analysis of the effect that defendant action has on other variables such as costs and/or 
where defendant action can be considered as one variable in the process. 
It would however be possible to do a further piece of qualitative research on defendant 
behaviour to examine, for example: 
 
1. The reasons for defendant behaviour and, in particular, how decisions to admit or 
refuse liability are taken. 
2. Factors that influence defendant behaviour, the impact that claimant/panel solicitor 
action has on defendant behaviour and how defendants’ respond to certain actions 
within the protocol. 
3. Qualitative data from NAH panel members (and others) on attitudes towards 
defendant behaviour and its causes. 
4. Defendant behaviour in the investigation of claims and attitudes towards the 
instigation of proceedings. 
Methodology 
Completion of this research primarily requires the collection of qualitative data to analyse the 
specific behaviours of both claimant solicitors and defendant insurers within the protocol.  
We would also need to map all tasks within the protocol with a view to developing a ‘protocol 
matrix’ identifying the points at which delay occurs, the nature of the delay and its resultant 
impact on the progress of a case.  In doing so, our analysis would distinguish between 
defendant delay and other causes of delay to identify the crucial elements of delay impacting 
negatively on the progress of a case. 
We envisage discussions with fee earners and others involved in recording protocol tasks 
and defendant delay in order to properly evaluate this issue.  We would also require access 
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to relevant data on the extent of data in cases, where this has been recorded.  The data 
would be subject to the same confidentiality as data used within the current project. 
We would also need to conduct sufficient interviews to effectively evaluate defendant and 
claimant behaviours, any variations in these and their respective attitudes towards risk and 
settlement.  It is difficult at this stage to identify the precise number of interviews involved the 
sample size needs to be sufficient to ensure robust conclusions.  It would need to consider 
different functions within the protocol e.g. NAH panel members, ATE provider or other 
claimant insurers, defendant insurers and others as required.   
 
Timescale 
Access issues (for example the availability of interviewees and access to data) will determine 
the precise scope and timescales for this research.  However, the scope of the research is 
such that it requires a longer timescale than the current project and we recommend that as a 
minimum, a month be allowed for the research.  A longer period may be necessary if there 
are issues with access to interviewees.  
 
Outcomes 
The research will result in a research report which examines in more detail the issue of 
defendant delay by considering defendant behaviour within the context of the protocol and 
linking defendant behaviour to the defendant actions considered in this research.  We would, 
therefore, be able to assess the veracity of the claims made by Thompsons Solicitors28 and 
others that delay by defendant insurers’ is an industry tactic intended to frustrate settlement 
of claims and, in some cases, discourage claimants from pursuing cases to a resolution.  Our 
recommendations arising from this research could include; measures necessary to address 
defendant delay, regulate such behaviours or to address them via changes to the civil justice 
regime.   
A more detailed research proposal can be developed as required.    
To discuss further contact Dr Angus Nurse at anurse@lincoln.ac.uk   
 
                                                           
28 Thompsons Solicitors (2009) Civil Litigation Costs Review: Thompsons Solicitors response to the 
Interim Report 
 
